This paper investigates the maximal secret communication rate over a wiretap channel subject to reliability and secrecy constraints at a given blocklength. New achievability and converse bounds are derived, which are uniformly tighter than existing bounds, and lead to the tightest bounds on the second-order coding rate for discrete memoryless and Gaussian wiretap channels. The exact second-order coding rate is established for semi-deterministic wiretap channels, which characterizes the optimal tradeoff between reliability and secrecy in the finite-blocklength regime. Underlying our achievability bounds are two new privacy amplification results, which not only refine the classic privacy amplification results, but also achieve secrecy under the stronger semantic-security metric.
the maximal secret communication rate R * (n, , δ) for a given blocklength n, error probability , and information leakage δ, over wiretap channels. An exact characterization of this fundamental quantity is computationally impossible for most wiretap channels of interest; instead, the aim of this paper is to develop tight upper and lower bounds as well as accurate approximations. Throughout this paper, the information leakage to the eavesdropper is measured by the total variation distance (between proper distributions). More specifically, we consider two secrecy metrics:
• Average secrecy: the total variation distance between the joint distribution P W Z of the secret message W and the eavesdropper's observation Z , and an ideal distribution in which W is uniformly distributed and is independent of Z . • Maximum secrecy: the maximum total variation distance between P Z |W =m and P Z , maximized over all messages m in the message set.
As we shall see in Section II, the latter is equivalent to distinguishing security and semantic security [10] [11] [12] [13] , which are two secrecy metrics widely adopted in the cryptography literature.
Prior work: Hayashi [14] established general achievability bounds using the channel resolvability technique [15] (a.k.a. soft-covering [16] ) and studied the secrecy exponent (i.e., the exponential decreasing rate of the information leakage) for a fixed communication rate. Later, he improved the secrecy exponent by leveraging the privacy amplification technique [17] . For the setting of fixed and δ and n → ∞, Yassaee et al. [18] derived an achievability bound on the second-order coding rate [8] (also known as dispersion [7] ) by using the output statistics of random binning, which improves an earlier result by Tan [19] . Achievability bounds for wiretap channels with other secrecy metrics can be found in [20] [21] [22] [23] . On the converse side, Tyagi and Watanabe [24] proposed a one-shot converse bound for the problem of secret key agreement, which exploits binary hypothesis testing. Building upon the technique in [24] , Hayashi et al. [25] established a converse bound for wiretap channels, which leads to the strong converse for the degraded case. This result strengthens a previous strong converse established by Tan and Bloch [26] using the information spectrum method.
Contributions: In this paper, we develop new achievability and converse bounds on the maximal secrecy rate R * (n, , δ) for general wiretap channels. Our achievability bounds are based on two new privacy amplification results, which yield secrecy codes that satisfy, respectively, the average and maximum secrecy constraints. These bounds are expressed in terms of the E γ metric [27] , and establish a nice connection between two popular tools used in the achievability proofs of information-theoretic security-privacy amplification and channel resolvability. Our converse bound is motivated by the secret-key-agreement converse in [24] and the meta-converse in [7] . It relates the error probability and the information leakage of a secrecy code to the error probability of a binary hypothesis testing, and relies on a test that is tailored to the wiretap channel. Both our achievability and converse bounds are uniformly tighter than the best existing bounds (to the best of our knowledge).
By analyzing the behavior of our bounds in the regime of fixed and δ and n → ∞, we obtain upper and lower bounds on the second-order coding rate of discrete-memoryless wiretap channels (DM-WTCs) and Gaussian wiretap channels. More specifically, we show that
where C S is the secrecy capacity, and V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 are constants that depend on the stochastic variations of the legitimate and the eavesdropper's channel. This result holds under both the average secrecy and the maximum secrecy constraint. Furthermore, the achievable second-order rate in (2) improves on the ones derived in [18] and [19] . Bridging the gap between the upper and lower bounds in (2) for general wiretap channels seems very difficult. This can be done, however, for the class of semi-deterministic wiretap channels, in which the channel between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver is deterministic, while that between the transmitter and the eavesdropper is a discrete memoryless channel (DMC). Indeed, for semi-deterministic wiretap channels both the achievability and the converse bounds in (2) can be tightened, which yields the following asymptotic expansion for R * (n, , δ):
for every and δ such that + δ < 1. Here, V S is the conditional variance of an appropriate information density term. The key idea behind the proof of (3) is to understand the optimal tradeoff between reliability and secrecy. While it is possible to trade reliability for secrecy for a general wiretap channel, the deterministic nature of the semi-deterministic wiretap channel makes it also possible to trade secrecy for reliability (through additional privacy amplification). Notation: The cardinality of a finite set A is denoted by |A|, and the uniform distribution over A is designated as Q unif A . For an input distribution P X and a random transformation P Y |X , we let P Y |X • P X denote the marginal distribution of P X P Y |X on Y . If P X = Q unif C for some finite set C ⊂ X , then we write
For a real number x ∈ R, we let |x| + max{x, 0}. We shall consider the following "metrics" between two probability measures P and Q on a sigma-algebra F of subsets of the set A:
• p distance, 1 
• E γ metric [27] E γ (P,
= sup
with the understanding d P/d Q = +∞ in the singular set if P is not absolutely continuous with respect to Q • Neyman-Pearson β function β α (P, Q) min P T | X (1 | x)Q(dx) (9) where the minimum is over all random transformations P T | X : A → {0, 1} satisfying
II. DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider the wiretap channel (WTC) model (X , P Y Z | X , Y × Z) with transmitter X, legitimate receiver Y and eavesdropper Z introduced by Wyner [1] . The transmitter wishes to communicate a message W ∈ M {1, . . . , M} to the receiver while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper. We first introduce the secrecy metrics used in this paper.
A. Secrecy Metrics
A secrecy metric measures the statistical independence between the message W and the eavesdropper's observation Z . In this paper, we consider two secrecy metrics:
• Average total variation secrecy:
Following [28, eq. (7) ] and [29, p. 400] , we shall also refer to S(W |Z ) as the secrecy index of W against Z . • Maximum total variation secrecy 2 :
where Q Z P Z |W • Q unif M .
As we shall show in Theorem 1 below, the maximum total variation secrecy is equivalent to distinguishing security and to semantic security [10] , [13] (up to a multiplicative factor), which are secrecy metrics widely accepted in the cryptography literature. Formally, the distinguishing security metric is defined as
In words, DS(W |Z ) measures the (maximum) distinguishability of two messages m 0 and m 1 . An equivalent formulation of the distinguishing security is established in [31] :
where the outer maximization is over all distributions supported on the message set M, and P Z |W • P W denotes the distribution of Z induced by P W through P Z |W . The semantic security metric is defined as
Here, the outer supremum is over all probability distributions P W of the message W , and (possibly randomized) functions f : M → A and g : Z → A, where the cardinality of the common co-domain of f and g is unrestricted. The inner supremum is over all random simulators S (i.e., random variables) supported on A that is independent of f (W ). The first probability term measures the probability of success of the eavesdropper who tries to guess a function f of the message W upon observing Z . The second probability term is the probability of success of the eavesdropper before observing Z . Theorem 1: For every transition probability distribution P Z |W : M → Z, we have
Proof:
The following relation between distinguishing security and semantic security was established in [10] and [11] :
Furthermore, the bound DS(W |Z ) ≤ 2 S max (W |Z ) was implicitly used in the proof of [11, Lemma 5.6 ]. To conclude (19) , it remains to show that
and that
The inequality (21) can be established as follows 3 :
≥ max
Here, (25) follows because from Jensen's inequality and because the total variation distance d(P, Q) is convex in Q.
To prove (22) , we observe that (recall that Q Z
Here, (27) follows because under P W Q Z , the random variables g(Z ) and f (W ) are independent; (28) follows from the definition (5); and (29) follows because the mapping P W → d(P W Z , P W Q Z ) is linear.
B. Secrecy Codes
We next introduce the notion of secrecy codes for a wiretap channel. An (M, , δ) avg secrecy code for the wiretap channel P Y Z|X consists of • a message W which is distributed on the message set M = {1, . . . , M}, • a randomized encoder that generates a codeword X (m), m ∈ M, according to a conditional probability distribution P X | W =m , and • a decoder g : Y → M that assigns an estimateŴ to each received signal Y ∈ Y. The encoder and decoder satisfy the average error probability constraint
and the average total variation secrecy constraint
Remark 1: Note that in the definition of average secrecy code above, we do not require the message W to be uniformly distributed over M. However, the codes used in our achievability bounds satisfy this additional constraint. Our converse bounds hold regardless of whether the message is uniformly distributed or not.
An (M, , δ) max secrecy code is defined similarly except that (31) is replaced by the maximum error probability constraint
and (32) is replaced by the maximum total variation secrecy constraint
An (M, , δ) avg secrecy code for the channel P Y n Z n | X n will be called an (n, M, , δ) avg secrecy code. Furthermore, the maximal secrecy rate (average probability of error and average secrecy) is defined as
The maximal secrecy rate (maximum probability of error and maximum secrecy) R * max (n, , δ) can be defined analogously. By definition, we have
III. BOUNDS ON THE SECRECY RATE

A. Privacy Amplification
Our achievability bounds rely on the privacy amplification technique. Privacy amplification is a method of distilling secret information from a random source that is only partially secret [32] . More specifically, let Alice and Bob be given a random variable X ∈ X , such as a random key, which is correlated with an eavesdropper Eve's observation Z . Alice and Bob wish to publicly choose a (hash) function g : X → K with |K| < |X | such that g(X) is almost independent of Eve's observation Z , and such that the resulting random variable g(X) is approximately uniformly distributed over K. In this section, we establish two privacy amplification results that will be used to prove achievability bounds for wiretap channels.
Our first result refines the existing privacy amplification results in the literature.
Lemma 2: Let X , K be finite sets, and Z be an arbitrary set. Let P X Z be a probability distribution on X × Z. Then, 1) For every γ > 0 and every probability distribution Q Z supported on Z, there exists a function g : X → K such that
where L |X |/|K|,
and the expectation in (37) is taken with respect to (X, Z ) ∼ P X Z . 2) If in addition L ∈ N and P X = Q unif X , then there exists a function g(·) that satisfies (37) and g(X) is uniformly distributed over K.
Proof:
The proof is based on the left-over hash lemma [32] , [33] , as well as the optimal smoothing of conditional Rényi entropy of order 2 H 2 . See Appendix I for the complete proof.
Remark 2: The privacy amplification bound in Lemma 2 is stronger than most privacy amplification bounds found in the literature. For example, Renner's smooth min-entropy bound [33, Corollary 5.6.1] can be obtained from Lemma 2 by upper-bounding the expectation term on the right-hand side (RHS) of (37) by 1 and by using [34, Lemma 19 ]. Hayashi's exponential bound [17, Th. 1 and eq. (67)] follows by lower-bounding H 2 via Rényi entropy of order 1 < α < 2. The hybrid bound [35, Th. 6] , the information-spectrum type bound [35, Th. 2] , as well as the recent hypothesis testing bound [36] are based on sub-optimal smoothing of Renyi entropy of various orders, and are therefore all weaker than Lemma 2. For a detailed analytic and numerical comparison between various nonasymptotic bounds on privacy amplification, please refer to [36] and [37] .
Remark 3: The bound (37) can be further improved if P X Z admits additional (symmetry) structures; see Theorem 18 for the case in which P Z |X is the channel law of a binary symmetric channel.
Note that, the secrecy index S(g(X)|Z ) measures the average total variation distance between P Z |g −1 (K ) and P Z for the random variable K = g(X). The next result shows that there exists a hash function g such that the maximum total variation secrecy S max (g(X)|P Z ) is very close to the average. Its proof relies on Hoeffding's reduction argument for sample without replacement [38] and on McDiarmid's inequality (also known as bounded difference inequality) [39] .
Lemma 3: Let X and K be finite sets satisfying L |X |/|K| ∈ N, and let Z be an arbitrary set. Let P X = Q unif X be the uniform distribution over X , and let P Z = P Z |X • P X . Let G be the set of all functions g : X → K that satisfy |g −1 (k)| = L, ∀k ∈ K, and let G be uniformly distributed over G. Then, we have
where
with A = {X 1 , . . . ,X L } being a random codebook whose codewords are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to P X . Consequently, there exists a function g ∈ G such that
Proof: See Appendix II. Remark 4: In the applications of Lemma 3, |K| and L are usually taken to be exponential in the dimension n. In such cases, |K|e −2Lr 2 vanishes double-exponentially fast in n. Such a double-exponential convergence was first observed by Ahlswede and Csiszár [40] in the analysis of random bits extractors (see also [29, p. 404 ]), and more recently in the setting of channel resolvability/soft-covering [41] , [42] (see also [43] in the setting of covering for hypergraphs).
Interestingly, Lemma 3 connects privacy amplification to channel resolvability [15] . Indeed, given a probability distribution P X on X and a random transformation P Z |X : X → Z, the channel resolvability problem aims to find a set A ⊂ X with cardinality |A| ≤ L that minimizes the (total variation) distance between P Z |A and the target P Z P Z |X • P X . A good way to find A is through random coding. Namely, we generate each element (i.e., codeword) in A independently and identically according to P X . It turns out that the average total variation distance E d(P Z |A , P Z ) for the random codebook A is a tight upper bound on min A:|A|≤L d(P Z |A , P Z ).
The next result shows that E d(P Z | A , P Z ) admits an upper bound that is of the same form as (37) , which indicate that channel resolvability and privacy amplification are based on the same probabilistic principle.
Lemma 4: Let X be a finite set, and let Z be an arbitrary set. Let P X Z be a probability distribution supported on X × Z such that P X (x) > 0 for every x ∈ X . Let A {X 1 , . . . , X L } be a random codebook whose codewords are independently and identically generated according to P X . For every γ > 0, every probability distribution Q Z supported on Z, we have
where ı (·; ·) is defined in (38) , and the expectation on the right-hand side of (42) is taken with respect to ( X , Z ) ∼ Q unif X P Z |X . Proof: See Appendix III. In this paper, we will only use privacy amplification to prove achievability bounds for the wiretap channel. For completeness, though, we present a converse result for privacy amplification below, which shows that the achievability bounds in Lemmas 2-4 are tight up to some high-order terms.
Lemma 5: Let X , Z, K, and P X Z be as defined in Lemma 2. Then, every function g : X → K satisfies
Proof: See Appendix IV.
As a corollary of Lemma 5, we obtain the following converse bound for channel resolvability.
Corollary 6: For every finite set C = {x 1 , . . . , x L } ⊂ X , every P Z |X : X → Z, and every Q Z , we have
Proof: The proof follows by using Lemma 5 with X = C, K = {1}, P X = Q unif C , and g(·) ≡ 1.
B. Achievability Bound: Average Secrecy and Average Probability of Error
The privacy amplification lemmas developed in Section III-A allow us to convert an arbitrary (nonsecret) channel code for the legitimate channel P Y |X into a secrecy code with a guaranteed secrecy performance. By combining the random coding union (RCU) bound [7, Th. 16] and the dependence testing (DT) bound [7, Th. 17, eq. (79)] for channel coding with Lemma 2, we obtain the following achievability bound for the wiretap channel.
Theorem 7: Let P X be a probability distribution supported on A ⊂ X . For every L ∈ N, every γ > 0, and every Q Z , there exists an (M, , δ) avg code with a uniformly distributed message for the wiretap channel (X ,
and
Here, ı (·; ·) is defined in (38) ,
Proof: By the RCU bound [7, Th. 16 ] and the DT bound [7, Th. 17 and eq. (79)], there exists a code C = {x 1 , . . . , x L M } whose error probability over the legitimate channel P Y |X satisfies (46) . Next, we construct a secrecy code for the wiretap channel P Y Z|X from this code using Lemma 2.
Let X ∼ Q unif C . Then, by Lemma 2, there exists a function g : C → M such that g(X) is uniformly distributed over M, and such that for every γ > 0 and every Q Z
Here, the last step follows because the map P X → E γ (P X Z , P X Q Z ) is linear and because C ⊂ A.
Consider now a secrecy code with message W = g(X) and with a random encoder P X |W =m = Q unif g −1 (m) . In words, for each message m ∈ M, the encoder P W |X picks a codeword from the set g −1 (m) uniformly at random. The decoder first decodes the codewordX and then outputsŴ = g(X). By construction, the message W of the code is uniformly distributed, and the average error probability is upper-bounded by (46) , i.e.,
Furthermore, we have
From (50) and (53), we conclude that the resulting code also satisfies the secrecy condition (45) . Hence, it is an (M, , δ) avg secrecy code.
C. Achievability Bounds: Maximum Secrecy and Maximum Probability of Error
By a standard expurgation argument applied to the RCU bound [7, Th. 16] , we observe that for the legitimate channel P Y |X , there exists a code with M L codewords whose maximum error probability is upper-bounded by (see [7, eq. (220) 
Combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 with the achievability bounds in [7, Th. 21] and (54) for maximum error probability constrained channel codes, we obtain the following result. Theorem 8: Let P X be a probability distribution supported on A ⊂ X . For every L ∈ N, every γ > 0, and every Q Z , there exists an (M, , δ) max secrecy code for the wiretap
Here, ı (·; ·) is defined in (38) , and
and P XY (x, y) = P X (x)P Y |X (y|x).
In the proof of Theorem 8, we apply the privacy amplification lemma (Lemma 3) to a maximum error probability constrained code C for the legitimate channel. Since each codeword of C has a maximum error probability upper-bounded by over P Y |X , the maximum error probability of the resulting secrecy code is also upper-bounded by . The remaining part of the proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 7 and is omitted.
An alternative bound can be obtained by using the privacy amplification technique on an average error probability constrained code for the legitimate channel, and by using the concentration of measure technique employed in the proof of Lemma 3.
Theorem 9: Let P X be a probability distribution supported on A ⊂ X . For every L ∈ N, every γ > 0, and every Q Z , there exists an (M, , δ) max code for the wiretap channel
Here, ı (·; ·), RCU (·), and DT are defined in (38) , (47) , and (48), respectively. Proof: As shown in the proof of Theorem 7, there exists a code C = {x 1 , . . . , x L M } whose average error probability 0 on the channel P Y |X satisfies (46) . Next, we construct a secrecy code for the wiretap channel P Y Z|X from this code C using privacy amplification.
Let X ∼ P X = Q unif C , and let P Z = P Z |X • P X . Let G be the set of all functions g : C → M that satisfy |g −1 (m)| = L for every m ∈ M, and let G be uniformly distributed over G. Furthermore, let P e (x), x ∈ C, be the error probability of the codeword x over the legitimate channel P Y |X . By definition, we have
The key step of the proof is to establish the following bound:
where μ is defined in (40) , and r is an arbitrary positive constant. Setting r = log(2M+1)
2L
in (61), we see that the RHS of (61) is strictly less than 1. This in turn implies that there exists a hash function g :
Furthermore, the RHS of (62) is upper-bounded by the expression on the RHS of (58) according to Lemma 4. Consider now a secrecy code with message W = g(X) and with a random encoder P X |W =m = Q unif g −1 (m) . The decoder first decodes the codewordX and then setŴ = g(X). By construction, we have
Furthermore, the error probability of a message m ∈ M is equal to
Therefore, the maximum error probability and maximum information leakage of the resulting secrecy code satisfy the bounds specified in (59) and (58) .
To conclude the proof, it remains to show (61) . By the union bound, we have
Here, (68) follows from Lemma 3. Note that
where X 1 , . . . , X L are random samples without replacement from C, and d = denotes equality in distribution. Since 0 ≤ P e (X i ) ≤ 1 almost surely, and since E[P e (X i )] = 0 , we can invoke Hoeffding's inequality for samples without replacement [38] and obtain
Substituting (70) into (68) we conclude (61).
D. Achievability: Trading Reliability for Secrecy
Our next result shows that one can trade reliability for secrecy for a wiretap channel.
Theorem 10: Consider a wiretap channel P Y Z|X . Every (M, 0 , δ 0 ) max (resp. (M, 0 , δ 0 ) avg ) secrecy code for P Y Z|X can be converted to an (M, , δ) max (resp. (M, , δ) avg ) secrecy code with > 0 and δ = δ
Proof: Choose an arbitrary (M, 0 , δ 0 ) max secrecy code C. Let P C X |W be the stochastic encoder of this code, and let P C X be the empirical output distribution of the encoder for a uniformly distributed message. We construct a new secrecy code C from C by using the following encoder
The decoder of C is chosen to be the same as that of C. We shall prove that the maximum error probability of the new code C is upper-bounded by , and its maximum information leakage is upper-bounded by δ. Consequently, C is an (M, , δ) max code, from which the claim of the theorem follows.
Let D m be the decoding region corresponding to the message m. The error probability P e,m ( C) of C for the message m can be evaluated as follows:
where (76) follows from (73) and because C has error probability 0 . Let P C Z and P C Z be the empirical output distributions of C and C over the channel P Z |X , respectively. For every message m ∈ M, we have
Here, (78) follows because P C Z = P C Z , (79) follows from (73), and (81) follows because, by definition,
The result for average probability of error and average secrecy constraint can be proved similarly.
E. Converse Bounds
We first present a general converse bound. Theorem 11: Every (M, , δ) avg secrecy code satisfies
where P W denotes the distribution of the message (not necessarily uniformly distributed), and P Y and P Z are the marginal distributions of the Markov chains W → X → Y and W → X → Z , respectively. Proof: By the meta-converse bound for non-equiprobable messages [44] , every (M, , δ) avg secrecy code satisfies
Furthermore, by the secrecy constraint,
where the last step follows from (5) . Rearranging the terms in (84), we conclude that
Combining (85) with (83), and optimizing the resulting bound over all stochastic encoders P X |W , we obtain (82). The bound (82) is in general difficult to compute or analyze. Next, we prove a converse bound, which is motivated by the converse in [24] for secret key generation. This bound is both numerically and analytically tractable. Theorem 12: Let Q Y |Z : Y → Z be an arbitrary random transformation. Then, every (M, , δ) avg secrecy code for the wiretap channel (X ,
where P XY Z denotes the distribution induced by the code. Remark 5: Using the result in [24] , Hayashi et al. [25] recently derived the following converse bound (for the case of uniformly distributed message):
Our bound is stronger than (87) since
Proof: Fix an arbitrary (M, , δ) avg secrecy code and let P W XY ZŴ P W P X |W P Y Z|X PŴ |Y be the joint distribution induced by the code. And let Q W XY ZŴ P W P X |W P Z |X Q Y |Z PŴ |Y (see Fig. 1 for a graphical illustration). As in the meta-converse bound [7, Th. 26] and in [24] , the idea is to relate the error probability and secrecy index of the secrecy code to the binary hypothesis testing between P WŴ Z and Q WŴ Z through a suboptimal test. The following test P T |WŴ Z : M 2 × Z → {0, 1} plays an prominent role in our proof:
where η ∈ (0, 1).
One the one hand, we have
One the other hand, by (31) , the probability P WŴ Z [T = 1] can be lower-bounded as
To further lower-bound the RHS of (92), we observe that
Here, (95) follows from a standard change of measure argument. Combining (94) and (95), we obtain
Substituting (96) into (92), and using (91), we conclude that
The final bound (86) follows by rearranging the terms in (97), by the change of variable τ = δ/(1 − η) − δ, and by observing that
which follows from the data-processing inequality for β α .
IV. BOUNDS ON THE SECOND-ORDER SECRECY RATE
A. DM-WTC
We shall use the following notation:
The secrecy capacity of a general DM-WTC is given by [2] C S = max
where the maximization is over all probability distributions
For simplicity, we shall assume that there exists a unique probability distribution P * V X = P * V P * X |V that achieves the maximum in (103). Note that if the eavesdropper's channel P Z |X is less capable than the legitimate channel P Y |X , then the secrecy capacity reduces to [4, Sec. 3.5.1]
The auxiliary random variable V makes the evaluation of (103) difficult. An upper bound on (103) is given by [25] 
For simplicity, we shall also assume that there exists a unique probability distributionP * X that attains the maximum in (105).
Furthermore, we shall assume thatṼ (P * X , P Y Z|X ) > 0. Note that, the bound (105) is tight (i.e., C S = C u S ) if the wiretap channel is physically degraded [4, Definition 3.8].
Theorem 13: Consider a DM-WTC P Y Z|X . If + δ < 1, then we have
where C legit and V legit denote the capacity and channel dispersion of the legitimate channel.
Proof: See Appendix V.
A few remarks are in order.
• As implied by (111), the strong converse does not hold if δ + > 1. • It is possible to slightly improve the achievability bound (106) by using Theorem 10; see Section V-C. • By Theorem 1, every achievability bound on R * max (n, , δ) can be converted to achievability bounds on semantic security and distinguishing security. In particular, the bound (106) implies the semantic security capacity of wiretap channels recently studied in [10] [11] [12] and [45] . We remark that the proof in [10] [11] [12] is also based on the idea of privacy amplification. However, our proof techniques are very different from the ones in [10] [11] [12] . More specifically, the semantic security capacity was established in [10] and [11] under the additional assumption that the channel from the transmitter to the eavesdropper is symmetric, which allows the authors to invoke some channel-specific combinatorial arguments. Later, the proof technique in [10] and [11] was generalized in [12] to address wiretap channels under a slightly relaxed symmetry condition. In contrast, our proof is entirely probabilistic, relying on the concentration-of-measure behavior of random hash functions. Furthermore, our result holds for a general class of discrete memoryless wiretap channels. The achievability bound (106) is tighter than the achievable second-order coding rate in [18] obtained by using output statistics of random binning, and is tighter than the one in [19] obtained via channel resolvability. The latter two approaches use a random coding argument and bound the average error probability and average information leakage averaged over all random codebooks separately. They then invoke Markov's inequality to show the existence of a code that satisfies simultaneously the reliability and secrecy constraint. The use of Markov's inequality introduces a penalty to the second-order coding rate, which corresponds to the gap between (106) and [18, eq. (23) ]. In contrast, our result shows that every code that satisfies the reliability constraint can be modified to satisfy the secrecy constraint, thereby avoiding the use of Markov's inequality.
However, this does not mean that channel resolvability based approaches have worse asymptotic performance than the privacy amplification based approach used in this paper. In fact, it was shown in [20] and [23] that privacy amplification and channel resolvability achieve the same random coding secrecy exponent for wiretap channel codes constructed from i.i.d. random coding ensembles. The same conclusion also holds in the regime of second-order secrecy rate. More specifically, the second-order expansion in (106) can also be established by using the stronger channel resolvability result developed in [42, Th. 2] , which shows that the random coding procedure in channel resolvability achieves the correct second-order asymptotics [46, Th. 2] with a probability double-exponentially close to unity.
B. Gaussian Wiretap Channel
Consider the Gaussian wiretap channel
where {U i } are i.i.d. N (0, N 1 ) random variables, and {Ũ i } are i.i.d. N (0, N 2 ) random variables. Without loss of generality, we assume that N 2 > N 1 (otherwise the secrecy capacity is zero). Furthermore, we assume that each codeword x n satisfies the power constraint
The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel (112) is given by [47] 
Furthermore, the secrecy exponent of the Gaussian wiretap channel was studied in [48, Appendix D] . Theorem 14: For the Gaussian wiretap channel (112), we have *
and where C S is given in (114) and
Proof: See Appendix VI.
C. Numerical Results and Discussions
In this section, we compare the bounds proposed in this paper with existing bounds in [25] and [35] , and with the approximations provided in Theorem 14 for a Gaussian wiretap channel (with the O(·) terms omitted). The results are shown in Fig. 2 .
Let us first explain how each bound was computed. Note that, every achievability bound for the wiretap channel consists of two parts: a reliability bound on the decoding performance of the legitimate receiver and a secrecy bound on the information leakage to the eavesdropper (see, e.g., Theorem 7) . For the reliability part, we have used Shannon's channel coding achievability bound [49] , which is the tightest achievability bound for Gaussian channels [7, Sec. III.J-4]. In particular, let M Shannon (, n) be the number of codewords for a given probability of error and blocklength n implied by Shannon's achievability bound. The quantity M Shannon (, n) can be computed via the numerical routine in [50] . The maximal secrecy rate R * avg (n, , δ) can be lower-bounded by
where L may be interpreted as the number of "dummy" messages that must be conveyed through the wiretap channel to achieve the desired secrecy. To compute an achievability bound on R * avg (n, , δ), it suffices to determine an upper bound on L. Note that, each of the achievability bound plotted in Fig. 2 is computed using (119) and corresponds to a respective method for upper-bounding L. 1) Achievability (Theorem 7): The result is an application of the secrecy bound (45) . To compute (45), we have chosen Q Z to be a multivariate Gaussian distribution with i.i.d. N (0, P + N 2 ) elements, and have chosen A to be the power sphere S n = {x n : x n 2 = n P}. By the rotational symmetry of the set A and of the distributions P Z |X =x and Q Z , the two supremums on the right-hand side of (45) are both achieved by an arbitrary x ∈ A. In particular, we have set
in the computation. With these choices, (45) becomes CN (0, 1) distributed. The inequality (121) implies the following upper bound on L:
where the minimization is over all γ > 0 such that the denominator in (123) is positive. Substituting (123) into (119) we obtain the desired result.
2) Hybrid Privacy Amplification Bound [35, Th. 6] : The secrecy part of the achievability bound labeled by "Hybrid privacy amplification bound" is an application of [35, Th. 6] .
In particular, we have chosen X to supported on S n and R Z to be a multivariate Gaussian distribution with i.i.d. N (0, P +N 2 ) elements. Substituting these choices into [35, Th. 6] , we obtain that
for every θ ∈ (0, 1) and every η ∈ (0, δ), where
with Z 0 ∼ N (0, 1) , and γ n,α satisfies
with B n defined in (122). The bound presented in Fig. 2 is obtained by further optimizing (124) over θ and η.
3) Converse (Theorem 12):
To compute the converse bound (116), we first note that we may assume the channel P Y n Z n |X n is physically degraded without loss of generality. This is because the maximal coding rate R * (n, , δ) depends on the channel law P Y n Z n | X n only through the marginal transition probabilities P Y n | X n and P Z n | X n [4, Lemma 3.4 ]. The converse bound in Theorem 12 requires an optimization with respect to the input distribution P X n , which is hard to perform for moderate to large blocklengths n. To circumvent this problem, we have relaxed the average power constraint (113) to the equal power constraint
where we added an (n + 1)-th coordinate to equalize the power. 4 Indeed, by the data-processing inequality for β α (·, ·), we have
where the distribution P X n+1 on the right-hand satisfies the power constraint (127) with probability one. For notational convenience, we shall replace n + 1 with n in the derivation below, but P X n is now supported on the power sphere S n . Furthermore, we shall set
which coincides with the marginal conditional distribution P Y n |Z n of P X n Y n Z n for the case X n ∼ N (0, P · I n ). By the spherical symmetry of P Y n Z n |X n , Q Y n |X n , and the power constraint (127), and by using [7, Lemma 29] , we obtain that for every P X n supported on the power sphere S n , β α (P X n Y n Z n , P X n Z n Q Y n |Z n )
wherex n is defined in (120). This way, we have solved the optimization with respect to P X n in Theorem 12. Finally, we obtain from the Neyman-Pearson lemma that
Here, the random variableD n is given bȳ
∼ N (0, P + N 1 ), C S given by (114), and
The thresholdγ n,α in (131) satisfies (87)). To compute this bound, we have used the same optimization arguments as the ones explained in Section IV-C3 and used the same formula (131) to compute the β function in [25, Th. 6] . Note that, unlike the achievability part, the converse bounds in both Theorem 12 and [25, Th. 6] are expressed directly as an upper bound on R * avg (n, , δ). Several observations are in order. First of all, both the achievability and converse bounds derived in this paper are uniformly better than the ones reviewed above. Secondly, the expansions (115) and (116) provide reasonable approximations for the bounds in Theorems 7 and 12. Last but not least, there is a nontrivial gap between our achievability and converse bounds (which can also be inferred from the approximations (115) and (116)).
To understand the causes of the gap between the upper and lower bound in Theorems 13 and 14, we note that our achievability schemes come with two limitations.
• In our achievability schemes, the secrecy and reliability constraints are treated separately. In particular, the transmitter adds redundancy to the transmitted signals to guarantee reliability, and uses (separated) randomness to derive secrecy. The amount of redundancy depends on the quality of the legitimate channel and the error probability constraint, whereas the amount of randomness depends on the quality of the eavesdropper's channel and the secrecy constraint. While separation-based schemes are secrecy-capacity-achieving, it is not clear whether they are second-order optimal. A similar phenomenon occurs in the lossy joint source-channel coding setting.
Recently, it was shown that separate source-channel coding is first-order but not second-order optimal [52]- [54] . Furthermore, the gap in the second-order coding rate between joint source-channel coding schemes and separate source-channel coding schemes are characterized in [52] and [54] . • Assuming a separation-based structure, our achievability schemes further require the legitimate decoder to decode both the message and the randomness inserted by the transmitter. It would be interesting to construct schemes that relax these requirements, and to see if such schemes achieve better second-order secrecy rate. It is also interesting to find the optimal second-order secrecy rate for separation-based wiretap coding schemes.
V. SEMI-DETERMINISTIC WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we focus on a special class of wiretap channels known as semi-deterministic DM-WTCs. More specifically, in a semi-deterministic DM-WTC P Y Z|X : X → Y × Z, the output of the legitimate channel is a deterministic function of the input, i.e., P Y |X (y|x) = ½{y = f (x)} for some deterministic function f , and the eavesdropper's channel is a (noisy) DMC. Without loss of generality, we assume that the function f is surjective. Note that, in general, a semideterministic wiretap channel is not (stochastically) degraded.
The secrecy capacity of a semi-deterministic wiretap channel is given by [55] 
This can be achieved by setting V = Y in the secrecy capacity formula (103). An alternative expression for the secrecy capacity is given by
The equivalence between (136) and (137) follows because, for a semi-deterministic DM-WTC,
Throughout this section, we shall assume that there exists a unique input distribution P * X that achieves the secrecy capacity (136). Let P * Y and P * Z |Y denote the marginal and conditional distributions of P * X P Y Z|X . For semi-deterministic wiretap channels, the bounds in Theorem 13 match for the special case = 0, which yields 5 5 Rigorously speaking, the bounds in Theorem 13 do not directly imply (139), since there it is required that > 0 and that the dispersion of the legitimate channel is nonzero. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to prove (139) using the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 13. We omit these mechanical details here.
The main result of this section is a complete characterization of the second-order secrecy rate of the semi-deterministic DM-WTC for arbitrary and δ.
A. Nonasymptotic Converse Bound
We first give a nonasymptotic converse bound for semi-deterministic wiretap channels.
Theorem 15: Every (M, , δ) avg secrecy code for the semi-deterministic DM-WTC P Y Z|X satisfies
is continuous in the topology of total variation. Moreover, since the probability simplexes P(X ) and P(Z) are compact, a minimizer for E γ (P Y Z|X • P X , Q unif Y Q Z ) exists. Proof: Choose an arbitrary (M, , δ) avg secrecy code. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the decoder at the legitimate receiver is deterministic, and that the error probability constraint (31) holds with equality. Denote by D m , m ∈ M, the decoding region for message m. By definition, we have
Next, we derive a lower bound on the secrecy index S(W |Z ) = d(P W Z , Q unif W P Z ) by using a suboptimal set E in (5). Let 
where the threshold γ will be specified later. On the one hand, we have
On the other hand, we have
where (150) follows from the union bound. Setting γ = |Y|/(M(1 − )), and using (7), (148), and (151), we finally obtain
This concludes the proof.
B. Trading Secrecy for Reliability
In Section III-D, we have shown that one can trade reliability for secrecy for an arbitrary wiretap channel. While the converse is not true in general, the following result shows that one can trade secrecy for reliability for a semi-deterministic wiretap channel.
Theorem 16: Every (M, , δ) avg secrecy code for a semi-deterministic wiretap channel can be converted to an (M , 0, δ ) avg secrecy code for the same channel, where M ∈ N and
Consequently, we have R * avg (n, , δ) ≤ R * avg n, 0,
where τ n is an arbitrary positive constant that satisfies 4M(1 − )τ 2 n ∈ N.
Proof: Choose an arbitrary (M, , δ) avg secrecy code. Note that, by (155) in the proof of Theorem 15, this code must satisfy
where P c X was defined in (144). Let P c Y and P c X |Y be the marginal (conditional) distributions of P c X P Y |X . Then, using P c X |Y as a prefix to the channel P Y Z|X , we obtain an auxiliary semi-deterministic wiretap channel P c
By construction, every secrecy code for the auxiliary channel P c Y Z|Ŷ induces a secrecy code for the original channel P Y Z|X by a standard channel pre-fixing argument. Furthermore,
Next, we construct a secrecy code for the auxiliary channel P c Y Z|Ŷ as follows. Let M ∈ N be a positive integer. Using Lemma 2 on the joint distribution P Y Z with γ = |Y|/ (M(1 − )), and upper-bounding the expectation term on the RHS of (37) by 1, we conclude that there exists a mapping
Let now the message W be distributed according to g(Ŷ ) whereŶ ∼ P c Y . For each message m ∈ {1, . . . , M }, the stochastic encoder PŶ |W =m is chosen to be the conditional distribution ofŶ ∼ P c Y givenŶ ∈ g −1 (m). Such a code has zero error over the legitimate channel since the sets
This concludes the first part of the theorem. The bound (158) follows by choosing M = exp(n R *   avg (n, , δ) ) and by setting M = 4M(1 − )τ 2 n .
C. Second-Order Secrecy Rate
Using Theorems 10 and 16 in (139), we obtain the following complete characterization of the second-order secrecy rate for semi-deterministic wiretap channels.
Theorem 17: Consider a semi-deterministic DM-WTC P Y Z|X . Assume that 1) There exists a unique input distribution P * X that achieves the secrecy capacity (136).
where V S is given in (140 
where (166) follows Theorem 10, and (167) follows from (139). On the converse side, we have R * avg (n, , δ)
where (168) 
Since the legitimate channel is noiseless and since the function f defining the channel P Y |X is surjective, we can prefix an arbitrary random transformation PŶ n |X n to the channel P Y n |X n , and transmit |Y| n codewords in the channelŶ n → X n → Y n without making an error. Furthermore, since d(P, Q) ≤ 1 for every pair of probability distributions P and Q, the secrecy constraint is trivially satisfied without any additional processing. This implies that R * max (n, 0, 1) ≥ |Y|. A few remarks are in order. 1) An alternative expression for V S is
2) It follows from (164) that neither the achievability nor the converse bound in Theorem 13 is tight for the semi-deterministic wiretap channels (unless = 0).
3) The expansion (164) is still valid if one of the average
constraints in the definition of R * avg (n, , δ) is replaced with its maximum counterpart.
4) The expansion (164) is still valid if the channel between
the transmitter and the eavesdropper is discrete input and continuous output. 5) Interestingly, the second-order rate in Theorem 17 does not match the second-order rate of secret key generation (although the first-order rates in the two settings do match each other). As shown in Hayashi et al. [56] , the latter rate (for independent and identically distributed sources X n , Y n , and Z n ) is
where denotes the probability that the keys generated by the legitimate users do not coincide, δ represents a secrecy constraint similar to (32) , and V is a constant depending on the stochastic variation of the sources. This comparison reveals a subtle difference in the tradeoffs between reliability and secrecy in the two settings. Another interesting observation is that, if the wiretap channel is augmented by an authenticated public discussion channel, then the second-order secrecy rate is equal to the one in (172) [22] . 6) In our conference paper [57] , we proved the achievability part of (164) using a stronger soft-covering (channel resolvability) lemma for constant-composition codes similar to the one developed in [42] . Our proof here is based on the (strong) privacy amplification result in Lemma 3, and is much simpler.
D. The Binary Symmetric Wiretap Channel
Consider a specific wiretap channel, where X = Y = Z = F 2 , P Y |X = ½{Y = X}, and P Z |X is a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability p. We shall refer to this channel as the binary symmetric wiretap channel (BS-WTC). Without loss of generality, we assume p < 1/2. Theorem 18: For the BS-WTC with crossover probability p, there exists an (n, 2 k , , δ) avg secrecy code with uniformly distributed message such that
where k ∈ N,
with [x] + max{x, 0} and B following the binomial distribution with parameters n and p, and
Furthermore, there exists an (n, 2 k , , δ) max secrecy code such that
Conversely, every (n, M, , δ) avg secrecy code satisfies
Proof: The achievability bounds (173) and (177) follow from strengthened versions of Lemma 2 and Lemma 4. The converse bound (178) follows by showing that the optimal P X and Q Z in (141) are both uniform distributions over F n 2 . Their proofs are given in Appendix VII. An application of the general converse bound in Theorem 12 yields the following result.
Theorem 19: Every (n, M, , δ) avg secrecy code for the BS-WTC with crossover probability p satisfies
where 0 ≤ λ < 1 and the integer 1 ≤ n 0 ≤ n are defined by
Proof: To prove the converse bound (179), we shall apply (86) with Q Y |Z chosen as the n-fold BSC with cross-over probability p. Then, by the symmetry of P Z |X and Q Y |X , it can be shown that β α (P X n Y n Z n , P X n Z n Q Y n |Z n ) = β α (P Y n Z n |X n =x n , P Z n ||X n =x n Q Y n |Z n ), wherex n [0, . . . , 0]. Finally, the bound (179) can be obtianed by invoking the Neyman-Pearson lemma.
For the BS-WTC, the reminder term in (164) can be improved to O(1/n).
Theorem 20: For the BS-WTC with crossover probability p, and for every ≥ 0 and δ > 0 that satisfy + δ < 1, we have
where H b (·) denotes the binary entropy function, and
Proof: See Appendix VIII. Remark 7: The strengthened achievability bounds (173) and (177) are crucial in establishing the correct order O(1/ √ n) in the achievability bound. For comparison, the bound (37) in Lemma 2 yields − 1 2 log n for the third-order term.
In Fig. 3 , we plot the bounds (173), (178) and (179) for p = 0.11, and δ = = 10 −3 . Note that, (173) is equivalent to the following
where the minimization is over all γ > 0 that satisfies g n (γ ) < δ/(1 − ). For comparison, we also plot the approximation (183). From this figure, we see that the new converse bound in (178) is uniformly tighter than (179). Numerically, the maximum secrecy rate at blocklength 400 is between 0.34 and 0.36 bits/ch. use.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have established nonasymptotic achievability and converse bounds on the maximum secret communication rate R * (n, , δ) for a given blocklength n, error probability , and information leakage δ over wiretap channels. These bounds are shown to be tighter than the best previously known bounds. The proofs of our achievability bounds are based on new privacy amplification results that may be useful for other security problems. We have also established connections between privacy amplification and channel resolvability, and have used this connection to derive tighter bounds for channel resolvability.
By analyzing the nonasymptotic bounds, we have further derived upper and lower bounds on the second-order secrecy rate for general discrete memoryless wiretap channels and for Gaussian wiretap channels. For the special case of semi-deterministic wiretap channels, we have established the exact second-order secrecy rate, which characterizes the optimal tradeoff between reliability and secrecy in the finite-blocklength regime. For general (non-deterministic) wiretap channels, the problem of establishing the second-order secrecy rate is still open.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF LEMMA 2
The proof is based on random hashing (also known as universal hashing) and the left-over hash lemma [32] , [33] .
A. Proof of Part 1
Let G be a random function from X to K that satisfies the following collision probability bound
In other words, G is a universal 2 hash function [32] , [58] . 6 Let R X Z be an arbitrary nonnegative measure (not necessarily a probability measure) supported on X × Z, and let R Z be the projection of R X Z onto Z. The average secrecy index of G can be evaluated as follows:
Here, (190) follows from the triangle inequality, and (191) follows from the data-processing inequality for the 1 -norm · 1 . Using the left-over hash lemma [33, Sec. 5 .5], we can 6 One example of a universal 2 hash function is the one that is uniformly distributed over the set of all functions from X to K (see [32, Sec. IV]). further upper-bound the second term in the RHS of (191) as follows:
denotes the conditional Rényi entropy of order 2 relative to Q Z , and Q Z is an arbitrary probability distribution on Z. Substituting (192) into (191), we conclude that
Note that the steps in (187)-(193) are essentially the ones used in [33, Sec. 5.5] and [17] . The reason that we present them here is two-fold. First, as will be shown in the proof of Lemma 4, the same bounding techniques as above can be used to analyze channel resolvability. Second, as will be shown in Appendix VII-A, if the distribution P X Z admits further structures (e.g., symmetry), then the bounds (190) can be tightened. We next minimize the RHS of (193) over R X Z . This is unlike the existing privacy amplification results (for example, those discussed previously), in which one selects a convenient R X Z and then proves an upper bound on (193). Consider the following optimization problem
where ∈ [0, 2]. It is not difficult to see that the optimal R * X Z must satisfy R * X Z (x, z) ≤ P X Z (x, z) for every pair (x, z), i.e., (194) is equivalent to
Indeed, suppose on the contrary that there exists (x 0 , z 0 ) which satisfy R * X Z (x 0 , z 0 ) > P X Z (x 0 , z 0 ). Since the objective function in (194) is monotonically increasing with R X Z (x 0 , z 0 ), we can further decrease it by setting R * X Z (x 0 , z 0 ) = P X Z (x 0 , z 0 ) without violating the constraint in (194) . But this contradicts the assumption that R * X,Z is the optimizer of (194). Therefore, we must have R * X,Z ≤ P X Z . Observe now that the problem (195) is a convex optimization problem. Hence, by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition [59, Sec. 5.5.3] , the optimizer of (195) must take the form
where γ is chosen such that P X Z − R * X Z 1 =. Using (196) in the first term on the RHS of (193), we obtain
The term exp(−H 2 (R * X Z |Q Z )) can be evaluated as follows:
Substituting (201) and (197) into (193), we conclude that for every γ > 0,
Finally, the inequality (202) implies that there exists a g ∈ G for which (37) holds.
B. Proof of Part 2
Let G be the set of all functions g from X to K that satisfies g −1 (k) = L for every k ∈ K. Let G be uniformly distributed over the set G. It is not difficult to check that such a random function satisfies the collision probability bound (186), i.e., it is a universal 2 function. As such, it satisfies the bound (202). Furthermore, for every g ∈ G we have g(X) ∼ Q unif K , where X ∼ Q unif X . This concludes the proof of Part 2.
APPENDIX II PROOF OF LEMMA 3
By the union bound and the Chernoff bound, we have
where t is an arbitrary positive constant. Observe that the random variable d(P Z |G −1 (1) , P Z ) can be rewritten as d(P Z |G −1 (1) , P Z )
where d = denotes equality in distribution, and X 1 , . . . , X L are distributed according to the joint distribution
In other words, X L 1 are random samples without replacement from X .
We proceed to upper-bound E e th(X L 1 ) . The key idea is to replace the dependent random variables X L 1 with the i.i.d. samplesX L 1 defined in the lemma. More specifically, we shall prove that
This is done by using the elegant reduction argument of Hoeffding [38] . Let
Since f (·) is symmetric in its arguments, there exists a symmetric functionf :
as observed in [38, Sec. 5] . Such a function takes the form
where the sum is taken over the integers k, r 1 , . . . , r k , i 1 , . . . , i k such that k ∈ {1, . . . , L}, r 1 + · · · + r k = n, {i 1 , . . . , i k } ⊂ {1, . . . , L} are distinct, and p k,r 1 ,...,r k ,i 1 ,...,i k = 1.
(213)
To prove (209), it suffices to show that
Consider the chain of inequalities given in (215)-(218) on the top of the next page. Here, the functions {g z (·)} are defined as
Here, (215) follows from Jensen's inequality and the convexity of x → e t x ; (216) follows from (207); (217) follows from the triangle inequality; and finally, (218) follows because
This concludes (214), and, hence (209). Now, observe that the partial discrete derivatives of h(·) are uniformly bounded, i.e., sup y,y ∈X |h( 
This allows us to conclude that (see the proof of McDiarmid's inequality [39] and [60, eq. (2.2.25) ], and recall that μ = E h(X L 1 ) )
Using (222) and (209) in (204), we conclude that
The choice t = 4r L minimizes the RHS of (223) and yields (39) . Finally, using r = log(1 + |K|)/(2L) on the RHS of (39), we obtain
which implies (41) .
APPENDIX III PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Consider
As in the proof of Lemma 2, we shall split the random variable
into two parts. Let {R Z |X =x } x∈X be a sequence of arbitrary nonnegative measures indexed by x. Let
It follows that
Here, in (230) we have used the triangle inequality and Jensen's inequality. The second term on the RHS of (231) can be evaluated as follows:
As in the proof of Lemma 2, we shall minimize the RHS of (235) over all R Z |X that satisfy
The minimizer takes the form
where γ is chosen such that P X Z − R * Z |X P X 1 =. Substituting (237) into (235), and then (237) and (235) into (231), we conclude the proof of Lemma 4.
APPENDIX IV PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Let ı (·; ·) be defined as in (38) . Let K g(X). By definition, for every m ∈ M and every γ > 0, we have
The first term on the RHS of (238) can be bounded as
The second term on the RHS of (238) can be bounded using the union bound as follows:
Substituting (241) and (243) into (238), setting γ = L = |X |/|K|, we obtain
APPENDIX V PROOF OF THEOREM 13
A. Achievability
To prove the achievability bound (106), we shall use Theorem 8 with a constant-composition code. The reason for using constant-composition codes instead of i.i.d. codes is two-fold. First, for a properly chosen Q Z n , all codewords x n of a constant-composition code have the same E γ (P Z n |X n =x n , Q Z n ). Secondly, constant-composition codes achieve the conditional variances V 1 and V 2 , whereas i.i.d. codes achieve (the slightly bigger) unconditional variances. For simplicity of presentation, we only prove (106) for the special case in which
Using channel prefixing, we can generalize the proof in a straightforward manner to the case in which this condition does not hold. Before presenting the proof, we first introduce some standard notation used in the method of types [29, Ch. 2] . We denote the simplex of probability distributions on a finite alphabet A by P(A). The set of all n-types on A is defined as
The subset of sequences in A n with the same type P is denoted by T n P (A) or simply T n P if the alphabet A is clear from the context. Let P n ∈ P n (X ) be the type that is closest in total variation distance to the (unique) secrecy-capacity-achieving input distribution P * X . Furthermore, let P X n = Q unif T Pn (X ) denote the uniform distribution over the type class T P n (X ), and let P Y n P Y n |X n • P X n . Using the permutation symmetry of the type class T P n (X ) and of the channel P Z n |X n , it follows that the probability term
takes the same value for every x n ∈ T P n (X ). As a consequence, we have by [7, Th. 22] DT,max (a) = 1 − E a (P X n P Y n |X n , P X n P Y n ).
Next, we evaluate E a (P X n P Y n |X n , P X n P Y n ) for a given a > 0 as follows:
Here, (250) follows from (8) , and (251) follows by relaxing the infimum on the RHS of (250) with γ 1 = √ na and by applying the standard change of measure technique to the second term on the RHS of (250). Suppose that V 1 = V (P * X , P Y |X ) > 0. Proceeding as in the proof of [9, Th. 4.2] , we can further upper-bound the RHS of (251) by
This implies that there exists an a n = n −1/2 exp n I (X;
that satisfies ≥ 1 − E a n (P X n P Y n |X n , P X n P Y n ).
For the case V 1 = 0, we have that
which follows because |P n − P * X | = O(1/n) and because P → V (P, P Y |X ) are smooth maps on the interior of the probability simplex on X . Proceeding step by step as in the proof of [9, Th. 4.2] , and using Chebyshev's inequality and (255) in place of [9, eq. (4.53)], we conclude that (252) and (254) remain to hold if V 1 = 0. Let γ n (x n , δ) inf γ : E γ (P Z n |X n =x n , Q Z n )
where a n is given in (253) and Q Z n is set to be the product distribution (P Z |X • P n ) n . Setting γ = sup x n ∈T Pn γ n (x n , δ), L = nγ , M n = a n /L, and using (256), (254), and Theorem 8, we conclude that there exists an (n, M n , , δ) max secrecy code. Therefore,
It remains to evaluate γ n (x n , δ). Using the permutation symmetry of T P n and of P Z n |X n , we see that γ n (x n , δ) takes the same value for every x n ∈ T P n . We next upper-bound E γ (P Z n |X n =x n , Q Z n ). In the analysis below, we shall assume that V 2 = V (P * X , P Y |X ) > 0. The case V 2 = 0 can be handled similarly as in (255). Consider the following chain of (in)equalities:
Here, (261) follows from the Berry-Esseen theorem [61, Sec. XVI.5] and [7, Lemma 46] , and (262) follows because |P n − P * X | = O(1/n) and because P → I (P, P Z |X ) and P → V (P, P Z |X ) are smooth maps on the interior of the probability simplex on X . Furthermore, we have E exp(−|ı (x n ; Z n ) − log γ |) ≤ 1 (263) and log(1 + a n /(nγ )) 2nγ
as long as γ ≥ n 2 . Together (262)-(264) imply that
Substituting (265) into (258) we conclude (106).
B. Converse
We next prove the converse bound (107) using (86). In order to apply (86), we need to select a Q Y n | Z n . Before doing so, we remark that in the point-to-point channel coding setting, a converse bound is usually proved by reducing a code to a constant-composition subcode (see, e.g., [7] and [62] ). The rationale behind this reduction is that removing all codewords except those of a dominant type reduces the coding rate by at most O((log n)/n), and at the same time it does not increase the error probability. A converse bound can be then proved by using the meta-converse bound [7, Th. 27] on the dominant type, with the auxiliary output distribution Q Y n chosen to be the output distribution induced by this type. This reduction argument, however, does not work for the wiretap channel, because it is not clear how removing codewords will affect the secrecy index S(W |Z ). Instead, we shall choose Q Y n |Z n to be a mixture of conditional distributions P Y n | Z n induced by all types in P n (X ). We now proceed with the proof.
For each type P (t )
Y |Z be the induced conditional distribution. Furthermore, let
Using this conditional distribution in the bound (86), we obtain that, for every τ ∈ (0, 1 − − δ) and every γ ∈ R,
where the second step follows from [7, eq. (102) ]. The probability term on the RHS of (268) can be evaluated as follows:
For an arbitrary x n ∈ X n , let t ∈ {1, . . . , |P n |} denote the index of the type of x n . Using (266) and using that log |P n | ≤ |X | log(n + 1), we obtain
Let nowγ (α) be defined as in (272) on the top of the next page. Following similar steps as in the proof of [7, Th. 48] , and using thatP * X is the unique maximizer of (105), that V (P * X , P Y Z|X ) > 0, and that P X → I (X; Y |Z ) is concave, we obtaiñ
Finally, setting γ = |X | log(n + 1) +γ (1 − − δ − τ ) and τ = 1/ √ n, and using (273), (271), and (269) in (268), we conclude the proof of (107).
By [7, Sec. IV.A], the maximum communication rate over the legitimate channel for a given blocklength n and maximum error probability ( + δ − 1)/δ is lower-bounded by
Furthermore, since d(P, Q) ≤ 1 for every pair of probability distributions P and Q, the secrecy constraint is trivially satisfied without any additional processing. This implies (111).
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To prove (115), we shall use Theorem 8 with P X n being the uniform distribution over the power sphere S n {x n ∈ R n : x n 2 = n P} and with Q Z n ∼ N (0, (P + N 2 )I n ). For such a P X n it was shown in [63] that there exists añ a n = exp n 2 log(1+ P/N 1 )− nV 1 Q −1 ( −/ √ n)+O(log n)
that satisfies
Setting a n =ã n / √ n, τ = 1 − 1/ √ n, and using (54), we conclude that
Furthermore, from (276), we see that log a n = n 2
We next evaluate (55) . Due to the spherical symmetry of S n and Q Z n , we have that for every x n ∈ S n E γ (P Z n | X n =x n , Q Z n ) = E γ (P Z n | X n =x n , Q Z n )
wherex n is given by (120). The RHS of (280) can be evaluated
where the last step follows from [7, p. 2357 ]. The proof of (115) follows by repeating the steps (256)-(265) with (282) used in place of (262).
To establish the converse bound (116), we shall use Theorem 12. In Section IV-C3 we explained how to solve the optimization over P X and how to compute the resulting bound. The key observation there is that, under P Y n Z n | X n =x n , the random variable log d P Y n Z n | X n =x n d( P Z n | X n =x n Q Y n | Z n ) (Y n , Z n ) has the same distribution asB n in (135). As in [7, Sec. IV.B], a central limit theorem analysis of (135) shows that
where V c is given in (118). Setting α = 1 − − δ − τ and τ = 1/ √ n, and substituting (283) and (130) into (86), we conclude (116).
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A. Achievability
To prove the achievability bound (173), we shall use a strengthened version of the privacy amplification lemma (Lemma 2). Fix a positive integer k and let M 2 k . Let X = Z = F n 2 , let K = M = {1, . . . , M}, and let P X and Q Z be the uniform distributions over X and Z, respectively. Let P Z |X denote the channel law of n uses of a BSC. It follows that P Z |X • P X = Q Z . Furthermore, let G be uniformly distributed over the set of functions g from X → K satisfying |g −1 ()| = 2 n−k , for every ∈ K. As in the proof of Lemma 2, we can rewrite the average secrecy index as
where R X Z takes the form (196). Since G is uniformly distributed over the set of functions g from X → K satisfying |g −1 ()| = 2 n−k , it follows that the summand in (287) is independent of k. Define the following quantities: (1) (P X Z (x, z) − R X Z (x, z)) (285)
The expression (284) can be rewritten as
(287) Different from (190), we now upper-bound the absolute value in (287) as follows:
Applying the inequality (290) to (287), we obtain
The first term on the RHS of (291) can be bounded as follows:
where the first step follows from data-processing inequality, and the second step follows from (197). The second term on the RHS of (291) can be bounded as in (294)-(299) shown on the top of the next page. Here, in (294), we have applied the following identity:
The inequality (297) follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and because z Q Z (z) = 1. In (298) we have used the left-over hash lemma by Bennett et al. [32] and the following identity: 
This implies that there exists a function g : X → M such that g(X) ∼ Q unif M and such that S(g(X)|Z ) is upper-bounded by the RHS of (302). Setting W = g(X), P X |W = Q unif g −1 (W ) , and using that the legitimate channel is noiseless, we conclude that there exists an (n, 2 k , 0,δ) avg secrecy code withδ upper-bounded by the RHS of (302). The claimed achievability bound (173) follows then from (72). Similarly, Lemma 4 can be strengthened to show that for a random codebook A with 2 n−k i.i.d. P X -distributed codewords, if P Z |X is a BSC, then
Using this result and Lemma 3 on the BS-WTC, we conclude the bound (177).
B. Converse
The proof of the converse bound (178) follows by showing that the optimal P X and Q Z of (141) are both uniform distributions over F n 2 . For the BS-WTC with n channel uses, the left-hand side (LHS) of (141) is equivalent to min P X n ∈P(F n 2 ) min Q Z n ∈P(F n 2 )
Our proof relies on the following properties of the function E γ (P X n Z n , Q unif F n 2 Q Z n ).
• Translation invariance: for every P X n and every Q Z n supported on F n 2 , the value of the function E γ (P X n Z n , Q unif F n 2 Q Z n ) does not change if we translate P X n and Q Z n by a fixed vector v n ∈ {0, 1} n simultaneously, i.e., X n → X n ⊕ v n (305)
• Convexity: the map (P X n , Q Z n ) → E γ (P X n Z n , Q unif F n 2 Q Z n ) is convex for every γ > 0. This follows because the E γ divergence is an fdivergence, and every f -divergence is jointly convex in its arguments [64] . For a given vector v n ∈ {0, 1} n and a given probability distribution X n ∼ P X n , we define P v n X n as the probability distribution of X n ⊕v n , andP X n as the distribution of X n ⊕V n with V n uniformly distributed over F n 2 . It follows thatP X n is also a uniform distribution. The probability distributions Q v n Z n andQ Z n are defined similarly. Now, by Jensen's inequality and the translation invariance and convexity of E γ (·, ·), we have E γ (P X n P Z n |X n , Q unif
≥ E γ (P X n P Z n |X n , Q unif
Therefore, (304) is indeed minimized by uniform distributions. Note that, the function g n (γ ) is equal to 
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The converse part of (183) follows from (178) and the following estimate log g −1 n (t) = n log 2 − n H b ( p) + nV BSC Q −1 (t) + O(1)
which can be distilled from [7, Sec. IV.A.1]. Here, g −1 n (t) : [0, 1] → [0, ∞) denotes the pseudo-inverse of the non-increasing function g n (·)
To prove the achievability part of (183), we shall evaluate the upper bound in (177) with the parameters k = n − log 2 (g −1 n (δ)) and γ = 2 n−k for some arbitraryδ ∈ (0, 1). Since γ → g n (γ ) is non-increasing (because g n (γ ) corresponds to the E γ "distance" between two probability distributions, which is non-increasing in γ ; see (309)), and since γ ≥ g −1 n (δ), it follows that g n (γ ) ≤ g n (g −1 n (δ)) ≤δ.
The term h n (γ ) in (177) can be rewritten as the expression in (313) shown on the top of this page. Here, Z i B i log( p/(1 − p)) with {B i } i.i.d. Bern( p) distributed. Using [7, Lemma 47] on both terms on the RHS of (313), we obtain
is a constant independent of n. Using (312) and (216) in (177), we conclude that there exists an (n, 2 k , 0,δ) max secrecy code that satisfies k = n − log 2 (g −1 n (δ)) (218) andδ = 1 2δ
This implies that R * max n, 0,δ
Here, the second step follows from (310) and by Taylor-expanding Q −1 (x) around x =δ. Combining (71) and (222) we conclude the proof.
